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Grain Ethanol - Why Consider Food for Fuel?1 
 
Richard K. Perrin 
University of Nebraska Lincoln, NE 
 
 
 In a scant eighteen months, grain ethanol production has doubled, and this year 
ethanol plants will consume about 30% of the country's corn crop.  This dramatic 
emergence has sent shock waves through agricultural markets, and has generated both 
public acclaim as a clean energy alternative and public excoriation as a colossally 
expensive, polluting, policy boondoggle.  The purpose of this presentation is to marshal 
some facts about the industry to help place it perspective so as to help in evaluate its 
potential impacts.   
 Because public policies are at the heart of debates about grain ethanol, I will first 
recount arguments for and against ethanol policies to increase ethanol production, then 
outline some industry trends and prospects, and finally, offer some evaluation of claims 
made for and against ethanol. 
 
ARGUMENTS FOR POLICIES TO INCREASE ETHANOL 
PRODUCTION 
  
 Ethanol was sold in some Midwest gas stations during the 1930's, promoted as a 
way to improve farm incomes by increasing the demand for corn that was selling for 
virtually nothing.  The current ethanol promotion policies have more recent roots – the oil 
crises of the 1970's.  Changes in policies since 2000 would not have been enacted without 
the concern about climate change - carbon dioxide building up in the atmosphere.  These 
concerns remain today, which we can summarize as arguments offered in support of 
policies to increase ethanol production:   
 1. Reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
 2. Increase energy security - reduce petroleum imports  
 3. Promote rural development 
 4. Reduce federal farm supports - support farm prices 
 
ARGUMENTS AGAINST POLICIES TO INCREASE ETHANOL 
PRODUCTION 
 
 Two years ago, very few of us anticipated the effects of the ethanol boom, nor had 
the debate about the merits of ethanol been at all in the public eye.  As of one year ago, 
the public began to be aware of the potential benefits of ethanol, as described above.  
During 2008, however, those who perceived potential hazards of expanded grain ethanol 
                                                 
1
 Presented at the GEAPS Exchange, Omaha Nebraska, February 25, 2008 
 began to get their messages out to the public, also.  These concerns can be summarized as 
follows:  
 1. Converting grain to ethanol will drive up food prices 
 2. Intensified crop production will deteriorate environmental resources 
 3. Grain ethanol won’t reduce greenhouse gasses very much, if at all 
 4. Ethanol will increase smog in heavy traffic environments 
 5. There are more efficient policies to achieve the objectives listed above 
 
POLICIES THAT INCREASE ETHANOL PRODUCTION 
 
 The most significant US policy supporting increased grain ethanol production is 
the Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit (VEET), a federal tax credit of $0.51 per 
gallon of ethanol blended for vehicle fuel.  A number of smaller federal subsidies are 
available, both for production, such as the $.20/gal small ethanol producer subsidy 
(available only to plants producing 60 million gallons per year (mgy), and only for the 
first 20 mgy), and loans and grants to assist the organization and construction of new 
plants.  In addition, ethanol imports except those from Carribbean countries are subject to 
a $0.54/gal import tax. 
 A number of Midwestern states have offered direct production subsidies, such as 
Nebraska's EPIC program that offered first $0.20/g and then $0.18/g subsidies for limited 
amounts of production for specified periods to plants that qualified. 
 Another type of policy consists of mandated uses of ethanol. Federal clean air 
standards mandate the use of ethanol blends to combat air pollution in some congested  
areas at some times during the year.  Even more significantly, both state and federal 
mandates have prohibited the use of MTBE as an oxygenate, and ethanol has been the 
fuel of choice to replace it.  The MTBE bans and related market disruptions, in fact, were 
responsible for the very high prices of ethanol during 2006, when ethanol production 
capacity was insufficient to replace MTBE reductions.  Now that the MTBE phase-out is 
essentially complete, however, ethanol competes with gasoline on the basis of its energy 
value alone, which is only 67% of that of gasoline.  We should not expect to see ethanol 
priced higher than 67% of premium gasoline unless production is insufficient in the 
future to meet state-mandated low-carbon fuel requirements. 
 We can summarize policies that have stimulated increased grain ethanol 
production in the US as follows: 
 1. A $0.51/gallon federal VEET subsidy  
 2. A $0.20/gallon federal small ethanol producer subsidy  
 3. Tariff protection - $0.54/gallon (except Caribbean area)   
 4. State subsidies 
 5. Federal and state mandates 
In the remainder of this paper, we will focus on VEET costs, as it has the most significant 
budget impact, though it is by no means the only policy.  It hardly needs to be added, but 
petroleum prices in the vicinity of $100 per barrel have had stimulating effects as well, 
but my concern here is to outline the public policy debate. 
 
ETHANOL INDUSTRY TRENDS AND PROSPECTS 
 
   The development of the industry in response to these policies is charted in Figures 
1 and 2 below (projections are based on current plants plus plants currently under 
construction.)  There was only a slight increase in capacity between 1980 and 2000, but 
then low corn prices and ethanol subsidies began to show their effect.  Then between 
2003 and 2004, oil prices doubled, and the Energy Act of 2005 liberalized the VEET 
subsidy and mandated that 7.5 billion gallons of renewable fuels must be used by 2012.  
These events plus the state MTBE replacement mandates set the stage for the steep 
expansion in capacity that is still coming on line in 2008. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. U.S. Ethanol Production Capacity
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Figure 2. U.S. Grind Capacity as Percent of Corn Crop
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  Despite these dramatic increases, ethanol still remains a small portion of the 
motor fuel market, however, as is illustrated by Figure 3. 
 
 The gross processing margin for ethanol (Figure 4) reflects the results of policies 
and other factors on expansion incentives.  The gross margin is defined here as the 
Figure 3. U.S. gasoline and ethanol 
consumption
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 wholesale value of ethanol (the rack price) minus the cost of ¼ bushel of corn.  The 
rationale behind this is that while one bushel of corn produces about 2.8 gallons of 
ethanol (0.357 bu/gal), one third of this corn is returned to the feed market at about the 
same value as corn itself, so the plant must withdraw and pay for only 0.249 bu/gal.   
 As shown in Figure 4, the margin exceeded $2.00/gal in 2006.  To put that level 
in perspective, the construction costs at that time were considered to be about $1.25 per 
gallon of annual capacity, and processing costs were in the vicinity of $0.55/gal.  Thus, a 
plant in full operation during 2006 would very likely have been able to pay off the full 
costs of constructing and operating the plant during just that one year of operation.  This 
was a powerful incentive for further expansion.  Due to much lower prices of ethanol and 
much higher prices for corn, the gross margin fell back below $1.50 in 2007. 
 Future expansion will continue to depend upon the outlook for the gross margin.  
Because corn ethanol will always be a small component of the motor fuel market (the 
ethanol from the entire corn crop would replace only about 17% of gasoline 
consumption), ethanol price will be determined by gasoline price, not the other way 
around.  Since ethanol's energy value is but 67% of gasoline, and its price will reflect 
that, as it does in Brazil where ethanol use is more mature. Gasoline price, in turn, will be 
determined by world petroleum price.  Thus the maximum price that ethanol plants can 
pay for corn will be determined by petroleum price.  If the price of corn were to persist 
below its value for fuel, ethanol production will be profitable and thus more plants will be 
built until the price is driven up close to that value.  Over the next decade, then, 
petroleum price will tend to determine the price of corn. 
 The arithmetic of this logic allows us to chart the long-run relationship between 
the price of petroleum and the price of corn, as shown in Figure 5.   
    
  The arithmetic of this chart is as follows.  The maximum price plants can pay for 
a bushel of corn is 4 times the value of a gallon of ethanol (since each gallon requires ¼ 
Figure 5. Maximum corn price for ethanol to compete with oil
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 bushel of corn), less about $0.80/gal production cost.  (Processing and capital costs are 
about $0.55 and $0.30 per gallon, respectively.)  Ethanol rack price should be about 66% 
of premium gasoline (premium because ethanol has a high octane rating), plus the VEET 
of $.51/g, since the VEET subsidy is paid to the person who purchases the ethanol at the 
rack for blending with gasoline.  We have found by regression analysis of past average 
annual prices that the wholesale price of premium gasoline has been equal to 
$0.145+0.0286 times the price of petroleum.  Putting these numbers together, with and 
without VEET, yields Figure 5.  
 Hence we should expect that if oil were to persist in the vicinity of $90-$100, 
plants will be built until corn price is driven to the level of $6/bu, or $4/bu if VEET were 
eliminated.  Currently, ethanol is using 30% of the crop.  How much of the corn crop 
would it take for ethanol to sustain corn prices at levels of $4 or $6?  It is difficult to say, 
but given that current prices are around $4 the capacity already in place is probably 
sufficient to support sustained corn prices at $4/bu. But how much more of the crop it 
would take to drive the price to $6/bu, we really are unable to predict. 
 
COST EFFECTIVENESS OF ETHANOL POLICIES 
 
 We do not have any clear criteria to evaluate whether the benefits and side costs 
of more ethanol are worth the treasury cost to implement them.  What I will do here is 
consider what we have achieved with policies, then calculate the simple VEET treasury 
cost per unit of achievement so far as I can.  This is a very rudimentary cost-effectiveness 
analysis.  First, it is a bit clumsy because we cannot allocate the VEET cost among the 
various objectives listed above – but we can attribute the entire cost to each objective 
sequentially to get a sense of cost effectiveness.  Second, the VEET budget cost is a very 
incomplete measure of true social costs of the policies.  For one reason, the subsidy 
includes transfers from taxpayers to people in the ethanol industry, which is a transfer but 
not a true loss to society.  Secondly, current consumers of grain suffer losses due to 
higher grain prices, but the dollar value of those losses must in theory always be smaller 
than the gains to producers (basically, food users of grain pay a higher price for only a 
portion of the crop, while producers receive the higher price for the entire crop.)  
However, we cannot really say that the value of a dollar lost by a consumer (who may be 
poor) is offset by a dollar gained by a producer (who may be rich – or vice-versa.)  
 
Greenhouse gas cost effectiveness  
 Greenhouse gasses are those that contribute to global warming.  The most 
important of these is the carbon dioxide (CO2 ) that we pump from the ground into the air 
when we burn fossil fuels - oil, coal and natural gas. Therefore it is common to measure 
the effectiveness of greenhouse gas policies in terms of the reduction in the number of 
tons of fossil CO2 emitted.  This is not easy to measure.  All of the CO2 released when 
ethanol is burned is CO2 that was taken out of the atmosphere by plants, so in that sense 
ethanol is carbon-neutral.  However, we do burn fossil fuels in the process of producing 
ethanol, natural gas in the ethanol plant, the fertilizer we put on corn, etc., so what we 
must measure is the "life-cycle" carbon neutrality of ethanol. This is done by estimating 
the amount of fossil CO2 used in the entire ethanol production chain.  Because this 
amount varies depending upon corn production practices and ethanol plant technology, 
 estimates vary and are hotly disputed.  
 Table 1 below uses some commonly-accepted estimates for measuring 
 
 
 
the carbon-intensity of ethanol.  Gasoline as burned is estimated to release 11.30kg of 
CO2 per gallon.  The amount of ethanol required to replace its energy (1.5 gal) estimated 
to have required 9.18kg of CO2, so when 1.5 gallons of ethanol replaces 1 gallon of 
gasoline, 2.13kg less fossil CO2 is released, a reduction of about 20%.  Given the VEET 
treasury cost of $0.51/gal, this converts to about $355 per metric ton of fossil CO2 
reduced.   
 To put this number in perspective, it has been estimated by the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Chang that a carbon price of as little as $20/ton of CO2 would be 
sufficient to reduce greenhouse gasses to acceptable levels, while current carbon 
exchange markets value it at $2/ton in the US and up to $20/ton in the EU.  We can 
conclude that treasury cost of VEET for just the purpose of reducing fossil CO2 is 
exorbitantly high.  But other objectives are met as well, so we now consider them. 
 
Energy security cost effectiveness 
 Petroleum imports in recent years have been about 5 billion bbl/yr.  As noted 
above, current ethanol production capacity is about 7.5 billion gallons, or 178 million 
bbl/yr.  Thus, current ethanol production replaces about 3.5% of petroleum imports.  If 
the entire corn crop were converted to ethanol, it would allow us to reduce imports by 
only about 10%, so ethanol alone will not do much for energy independence. 
  The VEET cost of ethanol is equivalent to about $21/bbl.  Is this a reasonable 
price?  I don't think we know what the social value of energy independence is, but at this 
rate, to eliminate all imports it would cost us about $100 billion per year (perhaps cheaper 
than war.) Bear in mind that in addition to VEET, we must also pay the cost of producing 
the ethanol, which with $4/bu corn, is about $75/bbl.  Calculated in this way, the total 
cost of a barrel of ethanol is about the same as we are paying for a barrel of imported oil. 
If ethanol costs us no more than imported oil, it’s a good proposition except for the fact 
that total ethanol quantities can barely make a dent on imports. 
 
Rural development cost effectiveness  
 Most ethanol plants have been located in small communities. The new jobs 
liter gallon
1. Fossil CO2 released in burning  gasoline (kg) 2.93 11.30
2. Fossil CO2 released in producing a unit of ethanol (kg)* 1.61 6.20
3.          adjusted(.676) for energy in gasoline (kg) 2.38 9.18
4. Fossil CO2 reduction,                                             
substituting ethanol  for a unit of gasoline, (1)-(3) 0.55 2.13
5. VEET cost per Mg fossil CO2 reduced, $0.51*1000/(4) $355
*Farrell, et al.  intermediate ("Today") level
Table 1. CO2 from fossil sources
unit
 created, approximately one plant job for every two million gallons per year of capacity, 
can make a very significant contribution to rural development.  Construction jobs are 
even more significant, but the construction period lasts only 2-3 years.  The VEET cost 
for two million gallons of ethanol per year is $1 million per year, not a very cost effective 
way to create a job.  But additional considerations can be introduced to either increase or 
decrease this measure of impact. 
 On the impact enhancement side, the existence of the plant does increase corn 
prices, thus increasing farm incomes which has some effect on rural development.  More 
significantly, the persons who hold the new ethanol plant jobs will spend their incomes 
on haircuts, groceries and other local services, and these expenditures create additional 
new jobs and economic activity.  Peters estimates that that under current economic 
conditions a 100 mgy plant adds 168 new jobs and generates $31.7 million in new value 
added economic activity to the local economy.  Under this scenario, the VEET cost falls 
to "only" about $300,000 per year per job – still not very cost effective. 
 On the impact reduction side, one must ask about the previous status of the 
workers in these new jobs.  If they were totally unemployed, then calculations of the type 
in the previous paragraph are appropriate.  But if they left other jobs to take the new jobs, 
then the calculated number of new jobs is too high – one job is lost, one job is gained, 
and it is theoretically possible (not likely in practice) that the net number of new jobs is 
zero.  Furthermore, since some employees may commute from another community, a 
substantial portion of the economic impact may occur well beyond the bounds of the 
local community.  To my knowledge, there have not yet been any studies that have 
attempted to calculate empirically the economic impact of an ethanol plant on the local 
economy.  But it seems clear that one cannot possibly justify the VEET policy on the 
basis of rural development alone. 
    
Farm support cost effectiveness 
 At first glance, one might expect the farm lobby to be supportive of ethanol 
policies, and politically, this has been true.  However, the livestock industry is heavily 
penalized by high grain prices, at least in the short run.  Most federal farm program 
expenditures, on the other hand, have been made on behalf of grain producers, and it is 
clear that they have benefited immensely, as US crop prices are up 75-100% from two 
years ago, and are taking an additional significant jump at this writing.  Most market 
analysts concur that current high prices are not the result of the ethanol boom alone, but 
ethanol clearly has played a major role.   
 It does seem likely that ethanol alone would have increased prices sufficiently to 
eliminate counter-cyclical and load deficiency payments to grain producers, which 
averaged $5.2 billion per year from 2003 to 2006.  The 2007 treasury cost of VEET was 
about $3 billion, so a $5 billion reduction in other treasury costs results in a benefit of 
$1.60 per dollar of VEET expenditure.  But as VEET costs increase to a likely level of 
$6-7 billion in the next few years, cost effectiveness falls from $1.60 benefit to $0.75 
benefit per dollar of VEET expenditure.  The benefits of ethanol subsidies in terms of 
reduced farm program payments is substantial, because ethanol-induced price increases 
of only 15-20% would be sufficient to eliminate the $5 billion in federal farm payments 
described.  
 
  
The cost to food consumers   
 Obviously, when ethanol demand drives up the price of grain, the price consumers 
pay for food must eventually go up, as well.  But, by how much?   That depends partly on 
how much the price of grain is driven up, and partly on the value share of the raw grain in 
the consumers' food basket. 
 USDA analysis (USDAa) suggests that corn prices will be 65% higher when 
enough corn is used to produce 12 billion gallons of ethanol per year.  Iowa State's 
CARD analysis (Tokgoz) indicates that corn price will be up by 75% if 14.8 billion 
gallons per year are produced, and that this will cause US consumer prices of all food to 
rise by 2%, and the price of meat to rise by 5-10%.  (Grain prices in January, 2008, are 
more than 100% higher than summer, 2006, prior to the ethanol boom, but this probably 
indicates that other factors are in play to drive prices so high.)   
 While there is much speculation and a few anecdotes about the effect of grain 
ethanol on food prices elsewhere in the world, I have not seen any careful analyses of 
that.  But some arithmetic can help estimate this, as shown in Table 2. 
 
        Table 2.  Effects of grain price increases on US vs third-world consumers 
 Sources: USDA(b), Ahmed. 
 
 Considering the US first, the farm value of grain used to produce the consumers' 
food basket is about 5% of the basket value, and food expenditures average about 10% of 
consumer income.  Therefore a 100% increase in grain price would increase food cost by 
about 5%, and this would be equivalent to about 0.5% of consumer income – not really 
very significant to US consumers.   Considering the worlds' food insecure population, 
however, the value of grain in the consumers' food basket is about 30% , and food 
expenditures are about 70% of consumer income.  In this case, doubling grain prices 
would increase food cost about 30%, which is equivalent to about 21% of those 
consumers' incomes. 
 Clearly, a doubling of grain prices means little to developed-country consumers, 
but could be a very difficult blow for the world's most food insecure consumers.  On the 
other hand, many of the world's poor are grain producers, and as opposed to urban poor, 
they will gain from higher prices.  The extent to which the world's poorest are producers 
versus consumers of grain will determine whether they are gainers or losers from any 
ethanol-induced grain price increases. 
 
The cost in environmental degradation  
 As the ethanol industry drives up grain prices, farmers respond by increasing 
acres devoted to grain crops and by increasing inputs on each acre to raise grain yields.  
 USA 
world's most 
food insecure 
grain as % of all food 5% 30% 
food as % of income 10% 70% 
grain as % of income 0.5% 21% 
income equivalent of a  
grain price increase of: 100% 0.5% 21% 
 Both of these responses pose threats to the environment.  Higher fertilizer and pesticide 
levels will be used, which will likely, but not necessarily, result in more of such 
chemicals in the groundwater and in rivers.  In the US, new land converted to grain 
production will be lands that are marginal row-crop lands because of slopes that are too 
steep, soil that is too rocky or otherwise undesirable, too little moisture, etc.  Potential 
environmental impacts of converting these lands to grain production include increased 
soil erosion, increased chemical runoff and greater extraction of ground and surface 
waters for irrigation.  In other parts of the world, new cropland will be carved from 
tropical forests, which will entail the same kinds of environmental threats as in the US, 
but will have more serious consequences for fragile ecosystems and will likely reduce the 
amount of CO2 that is sequestered in those ecosystems, thus offsetting some of the 
greenhouse gas benefits of grain ethanol. 
 These environmental costs may be quite significant without policy steps to 
ameliorate them.  But the costs are difficult to evaluate quantitatively, and I have not seen 
an attempt to do so.  These costs can be limited with appropriate agronomic practices, 
such as conservation tillage, precision application of chemicals, etc., but to the extent that 
these practices are more expensive for farmers to employ, they are not likely to be widely 
adopted without some incentives or regulations to encourage them. 
 
The cost in ground-level air pollution  
 A recent study by Jacobsen (2007) suggests that ground-level air quality might 
suffer with widespread use of ethanol as a motor fuel.  This study is based on 
measurements that have shown that flex-fuel vehicles burning E85 produce higher 
emissions of some smog-producing compounds than the gasoline the ethanol would 
replace.  The study used an atmospheric computer simulation model to evaluate the likely 
chemical effect of 100% use of E85 in the US.  Results from epidemiological studies 
were used to estimate the impact of these chemical changes on health.  The results 
indicated an increase of 4% in ozone-related mortality in the US.  While this research 
represents a heroic computational effort, one must question its relevance, since even 
under the new federal mandates for biofuel use, only 35% of gasoline is to be replaced by 
biofuels, with less than half of that to be ethanol from grain.   
 
Alternatives to grain ethanol policy   
 We have listed a number of objectives supported by increased ethanol use:  
greenhouse gas reduction, energy independence, rural development and support of 
farmers.  The most obvious alternative policies to reduce greenhouse gases and energy 
imports are to penalize their use directly with taxes on fossil carbon and petroleum 
imports.  These taxes would increase fuel costs for Americans, and politicians so far have 
decided that it is more popular to increase indirect taxes and costs instead, even though 
virtually all economists agree that the direct taxes would be more efficient.  European 
consumers have for decades been paying fuel taxes that double their fuel price as 
compared to ours, and they have responded by purchasing vehicles with fuel efficiencies 
that are also approximately double those of US consumers.  If we had done the same, and 
had by now achieved a doubling of our fleet mileage, the reduction in gasoline 
consumption would be almost exactly equal to the current level of imports.  
 A carbon tax would also stimulate ethanol production, with rural development and 
 farm support benefits as described above.  If a carbon tax doubled gasoline prices, it 
would also double the price that consumers are willing to pay for ethanol (now 
approximately $1.70/gal) which is a greater price incentive than the $0.51/gallon VEET 
now provides.  Such a high carbon tax would not be enacted, but this calculation 
establishes the potential impact. 
 Alternative policies that would effectively stimulate rural development are 
difficult to identify.  As for supporting farmers or farm prices, the $6-7 billion cost of 
VEET seems to be a bargain if it is responsible for even half of the recent increase in 
farm prices, because that extra farm income would far exceed the $5 billion transferred to 
farmers via the counter-cyclical and loan deficiency components of the current farm 
program. 
 
SUMMARY 
 
 Why should US policy support the use of grain for ethanol?  Grain ethanol 
production is very limited relative to total energy consumption, so it cannot have a very 
big greenhouse gas impact, and it cannot contribute much to energy security.  The VEET 
cost per rural job created is prohibitively high.  Diverting 40% to 50% of U.S. corn 
production to ethanol will drive up world food prices, perhaps at considerable pain to the 
poorer consumers of the world.  And expanded grain production will pose additional 
environmental hazards in terms of erosion, water use and water quality. 
 On the other hand, VEET, the primary component of ethanol policy, has low 
treasury cost – the current cost of about $3 billion per year will grow at most to $7-8 
billion per year if ethanol production reaches 14-16 billion gallons per year (using 40-
45% of the current level of corn production.)  Federal farm program payments of $5 
billion per year to grain producers under the current farm program have been eliminated 
for the foreseeable future, even though I think the current level of grain prices is not the 
result of ethanol alone.  Thus the ultimate net treasury cost of VEET can be argued to be 
only $2 billion. Carbon reductions due to ethanol, valued at $20 per metric ton, are only 
worth $0.3 billion.   
 It is hard to place a value on rural jobs and reducing petroleum imports, but at a 
net treasury cost of $2 billion, the cost is still over $200,000 per plant job, or about $8 per 
barrel of reduced imports. Increased food costs to the poor, even though they are 
exceeded in dollar value by increased revenues to producers, represent another cost 
difficult to quantify. Given these calculations and observations, the VEET program is 
barely defensible, even considering the treasury benefits of reduced farm program 
payments.  It is not defensible at all as compared to carbon and import taxes that would 
directly and more efficiently reduce fossil carbon emissions and petroleum imports. But 
these taxes seem not to be politically feasible at the moment, so perhaps VEET is a 
second-best solution for making some headway on climate change and energy security 
objectives. 
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